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In late 1989, members of the American Society ofReal
Estate Counselors participated in a survey about the
major forces that will influence real estate over the next
two decades. 1 The respondees agreed overwhelmingly
that the economic environment of the United States
would determine the vitality of the real estate market.
Despite a soft economy, therewas substantial optimism.
Nearly half felt that interest rates would stabilize at
about 9 percent over the next 10-20years. Ofthe remain-
der, however, almost twice as many expected interest
rates to increase as expected them to fall. The more
optimistic expectations were based on a belief, shared by
nearly two-thirds of the experts, that the United States
would become more competitive in world markets dur-
ing the next twenty years, resulting in an improvement in
the U.S. balance of trade.
According to many observers, however, the globaliza-
tion of the American economy, and its transformation
away from goods production toward services and infor-
mation processing will lead to greater income inequality
during the 1990s. Job losses will continue in higher
paying, traditional goods-producing industries with low
educational requirements. Job growth will be concen-
trated in newer, more technologically-oriented sectors
with high wages and educational requirements, as well
as in the service and retail trade sectors, which have
lower pay and educational requirements.
Despite the fact that our increasingly globalized econ-
omy is creating large numbers of high-wage, highly
skilled jobs, "the dominant trend in American job crea-
tion during the 1 970s was for low-paying jobs to replace
those which formerly provided a middle-class standard
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of living."2 This trend will continue into the 1990s. One
recent national study shows that 64 percent ofAmerican
jobs paid middle-level wages in 1979, while the share of
middle-wage jobs created during the 1980s was only 38
percent. Over half of the net increase in employment
was in poverty-level jobs.
During roughly this same period, inflation-adjusted
rents for poor households living in unsubsidized hous-
ing increased by nearly a third.3 Since 1981 all rents have
risen 16 percent faster than inflation.4 As a result, real
residential rents in the United States are higher now
than at any time during the past 20 years. This rent
inflation has exacted a heavy toll on the supply ofafford-
able housing, suggesting that homelessness will not
abate and that housing affordability problems will be-
come even more widespread and persistent.
According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies,
the number of units renting at or below $300 a month in
real terms fell by one million between 1974 and 1985. 5
Looking ahead, another 30 percent of this stock is
estimated to be physically inadequate or at risk of loss
through upward market pressures.6 Even without the
dramatic cutbacks in federally assisted housing during
the Reagan years, the affordable housing crisis would
have worsened.
Apart from the convincingargument for substantially
more federal housing assistance of all kinds, there is an
equally compelling case for more low-income home
ownership assistance. Formanyyears, the poor have not
received an equitable share of federal housing subsidies.
In just 1989 and 1990, the amount of federal tax expen-
ditures for all home owners totaled $107 billion, two-
thirds of which went to households with incomes of
$50,000 or more. This was approximately equal to the
amount of money spent directly on all low-income sub-
sidized housing programs during the 1980s. These same
tax breaks forhome owners exceeded $80 billion in fiscal
1991 alone,which is more than five times greater than all
budget outlays for assisted housing by the Department
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of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Home ownership assistance would also enable fami-
lies to gain financial equity in an asset. This could be
especially important to low-income minorities because
equity in a house represents a very large portion of the
net wealth of minority households.7 In 1988, 54 percent
of the average home owner's net wealth was equity in a
house. Although both net wealth and home equity were
loweramong black owners, equity accounted for fully 80
percent of their net wealth. Among Hispanics, home
equity represents virtually all (98 percent) of a house-
hold's net wealth.
For a variety of reasons, including racial discrimina-
tion, minority home ownership rates are substantially
lower than those for whites. This also means that "the
lack ofhome ownership opportunities for... [minorities]
has undermined their ability to accumulate wealth."8 It
further implies that properly structured low-income
sales programs could help remedy this injustice.
Significantly, the majority ofpublic housing residents
are minorities, as were more than 90 percent of all home
buyers in HUD's recently completed national Public
HousingHome ownership Demonstration. The amount
ofequity that public housing buyers ultimately accrue in
their units will depend upon the extent to which the
initial pricing and financing of the transaction accu-
rately reflects underlying market value, the nature and
length of resale restrictions, and the prospects for price
appreciation.
As long as there is real value present to begin with, a
low-income family can realize a relatively large increase
in net wealth even in a flat market, because home
ownership is such a highly leveraged investment. Each
one percent increase in price boosts a home owner's
return to equity by ten times that amount if she has a 90
percent mortgage, and by 33 times with a 97 percent
loan. The combination of mortgage amortization and a
five-year price-appreciation rate of just 3 percent a year
for a house that was financed with a 30-year, 97 percent
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan will gen-
erate a 40 percent annual return on initial equity. In just
five years, this modest rate of market appreciation will
produce more than a four-fold increase in the home
owner's initial equity.
There is a third, and often underemphasized, argu-
ment in favor of low-income home ownership programs.
Targeting the program to higher-income occupants of
public- and other federally-subsidized rental housing
will make these units available for poorer families on the
waiting list. According to HUD, it costs around $69,000
to build a typical new public housing unit. The operating
subsidy needed to keep the rent affordable to the very
poor over the economic life of the public housing unit
would add another $10,000-$15,000 (in present value
terms) to the federal cost. A program that would open
up an existing public housing unit by helping a family
move into home ownership at a long-term federal cost of
less than $80,000 a unit is more cost-effective than
building more public housing.
The FHA Reform Bill
Although the Bush Administration's one program,
the HOPE initiative, is consistent with a home owner-
ship-oriented, low-income housing policy, recent ac-
tions to tighten FHA mortgage lending regulations are
not. Stimulated by a Price Waterhouse audit oftheFHA
insurance fund which found that losses exceeded pre-
mium income by a wide margin on FHA transactions
that took placebetween 1975 and 1985, the FHAreform
measure enacted into law as part of the 1990 National
Affordable Housing Act increased up-front cash re-
quirements on a $70,000 house by more than $1,300 (a
44 percent increase). This is the result of an additional
insurance surcharge on low down payment loans, and a
two-thirds reduction in the amount of closing costs that
can be financed.
The Administration's emphasis on restoring the FHA
Insurance Fund to fiscal solvency is not necessarily
misplaced. However, requiring unsubsidized, lower-end
FHA insured loans to cover their own losses while at the
same throwing millions of dollars at a public housing
home ownership program that is cost-driven and with-
out market-based discipline does not make a whole lot
of policy sense.
Ironically, those in the Administration who success-
fully raised the cost of FHA financing to moderate-
income families in the name of fiscal integrity are the
same officials who have already approved spending more
than $30 million (more than $65,000 a unit) on the
rehabilitation of the 464-unit Kenilworth-Parkside public
housing complex in Washington, DC. The Federal gov-
ernment has since sold the complex to a resident man-
agement council for one dollar. While preaching actuar-
ial soundness for FHA, HUD gave its blessing to a
preliminary plan to convert Kenilworth-Parkside into a
limited equity co-op. To maintain its long-term viability,
this plan would have required resident incomes to in-
crease each year at a rate substantially greater than the
national average. When the General Accounting Office
(GAO) questioned the unrealistic underwriting assump-
tions of the Kenilworth-Parkside conversion, the pro-
ject's financial consultant defended the financing plan
with the comment that "in order to prove themselves
financially capable of purchasing their apartments, a
significant number of [Kenilworth-Parkside] families
will declare the additional [unreported] income they are
already making."9
The Administration's move to tighten up FHA's first-
time home buyer programs in accordance with the Price
Waterhouse recommendations, while not doing the same
to its various public housing home ownership initia-
tives, is myopic at best. At worst, it suggests an implicit
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policy to get the federal government out of the public
housing business at any cost.
The Lessons of the Price Waterhouse Study
The Price Waterhouse study contains five findings
that are particularly relevant to low-income home
ownership. First, there is an inverse relationship be-
tween the rate ofinflation for house prices in the country
and rates of mortgage default. During the late 1970s,
when house prices appreciated at about 12 percent a
year,FHAdefault rates werevery low. Since 1980, house
prices have increased less than 3 percent per year and
default rates have surged.
Default is most likely to occur when a borrower has
negative equity in a property. This usually happens
because the value of the property has fallen below the
loan balance. While a borrower's equity is a function of
several factors, the two most important factors are the
initial loan-to-value ratio and the subsequent price
appreciation of the property. Holding appreciation rates
constant, lower down payments result in higher default
rates. In fact, borrowers with an initial down payment of
3 percent or less defaulted on their mortgages five times
more frequently than those whose down payments ex-
ceeded 25 percent. To attach numbers to these rates,
nearly 9 percent of all recent FHA loans with an initial
down payment of 3 percent or less have already failed.
This compares with a failure rate of less than 2 percent
for loans with an initial down payment of 25 percent or
more. Additionally, within the FHA portfolio, lower
valued loans also tended to have a higher rate of default.
This was especially true for houses valued under $48,000,
where the failure rate was more than 8 percent.
The Administration 's move to tighten up FHA 's
first-time home buyerprograms ...while not
doing the same to its various public housing
home ownership initiatives, is myopic at best.
The economic model that Price Waterhouse used to
predict mortgage claims demonstrated that a home buyer's
decision to default on a mortgage will be determined
largely by their perceptions of home equity and their
desire or obligation to move. When real estate markets
experience significant and sustained declines, the best fi-
nancial option is often to walk away from the property.
This choice will be made when the resale value of the
home falls far enough below the market value of the
remaining mortgage balance to outweigh the economic
and non-economic costs of default.
Finally, it is frequently argued that, especially among
lower income borrowers, default is caused by factors
beyond the home owner's control, such as illness, di-
vorce, or unemployment. According to the Price Water-
house analysts, as long as borrowers have positive eq-
uity, they are more likely to sell their homes to recover
that equity rather than default on their loans.
The Results of HUD's Public Housing Home
Ownership Demonstration
Over a 51-month period (June 1985 through August
1989), the seventeen public housing authorities partici-
pating in the demonstration sold 320 public housing
units, only a quarter ofthe more than 1300 units theyhad
planned to sell. 10 Despite HUD's demonstration rule
that units had to be sold to existing tenants, lack of
effective demand among public housing tenants re-
sulted in nearly one out of every four sales to non-
resident households on public housing waiting lists.
Housing authorities encountered a variety of prob-
lems that affected their ability to carry out their home
ownership programs at the scale and pace originally
intended (or, in some cases, to carry them out at all).
These overlapping problems, which had a particular
impact on multi-family conversions, can be roughly di-
vided into the following categories:
• Lack of effective leadership, including internal
conflict within the local public housing authority
(PHA) and/or the community over the goals of the
public housing home ownership program;
• Poor program design and/or legal constraints con-
cerning title to public housing and involuntary relo-
cation;
• Adverse local market conditions, where public hous-
ing sales had to compete with the bargain sales of
FHA foreclosed houses;
• Lack of replacement housing; and
• Inadequate tenant incomes.
Too little time has passed to determine how well the
former public housing tenants have coped with the costs
of home ownership. There is, however, some data on
short-term affordability problems. To place these num-
bers in perspective, we should keep in mind that Price
Waterhouse has found that about 9 percent of all FHA-
insured, low down payment loans originated between
1975 and 1985 have already failed. The early evidence
from the public housing home ownership demonstra-
tion indicates that failure rates will probably be in the
same range. As of the end of August, 1989, five of the
demonstration's twelve active sales programs had al-
ready reported a problem with late payments or more
serious borrower delinquencies. Within the first 18 months
of closing, between 10 and 15 percent of the buyers
indicated that they were having problems meeting their
housing costs. About 31 percent of all buyers indicated
that their mortgage payments were causing a strain on
their budgets, and 10 percent said they were already at
least one month behind on their payments.
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In one demonstration sitewith two public housing co-
ops, one ofthe co-ops had a 20 percent delinquency rate.
In the other, a third of all buyers had fallen behind in
their housing payments within the first eighteen months
of closing and had little hope of catching up.
Annual turnover in one of these co-ops was about 27
percent, while in the second it was a lower 7 percent.
Virtually all of this turnover occurred without one market
sale of a single co-op share taking place. Despite Jack
Kemp's sentiment that "owning something changes
behavior in ways that no amount of preaching middle-
class values ever could," in at least one home ownership
site, one in five low-income buyers have already walked
away from their public housing co-op as if they were
renters. This brings us back to the Price Waterhouse
finding that even where the decision to move is caused by
personal factors, default is most likely to occur when a
borrower has no home equity.
In general, the typical single-family public housing
buyer has a positive equity position in the property from
day one. The buyer's equity, which equals the difference
between the market price of the unit and the discounted
sales price, cannot be immediately realized under the
terms of the deferred payment, second mortgage that
the housing authority holds. If buyers remain in their
homes beyond the expiration of the HUD- and PHA-
imposed resale restrictions, however, they can realize
the full amount of their initial equity by selling or
refinancing their property. Ifproperty values appreciate
during their tenure, so much the better. For example, in
buying their single-family public housing units at highly
discounted prices, buyers in Baltimore received an aver-
age of $5,300 in initial locked-in equity. In Chicago they
received about $17,000.
This is not the case in multi-family home ownership
projects. In two out of the three multi-family conver-
sions that actually closed in this program, sales prices
were based largely on total rehab costs with the financ-
ing arrangements designed to enable the housing au-
thority to eventually recover its capital costs. Rather
than reflecting real equity that the buyer can eventually
realize through maintenance ofthe unit and responsible
participation in the governance of the co-op, the forgiv-
able silentsecond mortgage held by the housing author-
ity represents excess debt. It secures that portion of the
rehab cost that the tenant buyers could not afford to
amortize on a current basis. Since buyers have negative
equity in the co-op from the outset, it is not surprising
that buyers walk away from their investments because of
unforeseen changes in their personal circumstances, the
responsibility ofself-governance, or mismanagement of
the co-op.
Conclusions
In light of the findings of these two studies, low-
income housing policies must pay more attention to
expanding low-income housing opportunities. It is more
cost effective to provide opportunities for higher-in-
come public housing residents to move out of public
housing into a home of their own than it is to sell offthe
public housing inventory. Rather than simply fighting
the administration's privatization policies, more hous-
ing authorities should be actively pursuing their own
home ownership initiatives that reward successful resi-
dents. In cases of public housing home ownership
programs, families should be given a positive equity
stake in their property from the beginning. Resale re-
strictions and prohibitions against "windfall" profits
should be more lenient than those proposed by many
housing advocates.
A public housing home ownership program should
have its own source of rehabilitation capital that does
not have to be fully repaid by residents when costs exceed
market value. This source should be separate from
existing rehabilitation programs so that the urgent need
to revitalize the public housing stock will not be com-
promised by a sales program.
Providing buyers with post-sales financial assistance
is necessary to any public housing sales program. Early
experience with families who have bought units under
the public housing home ownership demonstration
suggests that even with deeply discounted prices, many
families need continuing subsidies to keep their housing
affordable. The Administration is therefore correct in
proposing to make available housing vouchers to ten-
ants who buy their public housing units.
Home ownership must be a large component of a
broad-based, revitalized national low-income housing
policy. It should not be the entire policy, however. Given
the level of housing need in the country, successful
rental programs for the very poor should not be canni-
balized by any level of government in order to fund new
home ownership initiatives.
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